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tronize an enterprise that offers them a degree of participation and that can
meet their demands at realistic prices. Moreover, as owners of the business,
local residents will provide the cooperative with a virtual captive market.
Finally, cooperative enterprise is considerably more compatible with current public and private urban economic redevelopment goals. The establishment of viable, stable cooperative enterprises will aid in effecting a continuous recycling of credit and investment capital within the ghetto. Cooperatives
will provide many urban poor with needed jobs and the opportunity to learn
new skills. Moreover, the cooperative is eminently more flexible than traditional modes of enterprise and can be organized with a minimum of capital, retaining a portion of consumers' savings for gradual expansion.
It cannot be assumed that organization of consumer cooperatives will provide a panacea for the ills of urban America. Ultimate solutions to our urban
crisis will require imaginative, concerted effort in all major sectors of the
economy and may not be forthcoming without a major reallocation of national priorities. Within the ambit of current urban redevelopment objectives, however, the consumers' cooperative does provide a rational alternative
to traditional modes of enterprise.
ARTHUR CLIFrON BLACK
WILLIAM

T.

COLEMAN,

JR.

APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES IN FLORIDA:
A PROPOSAL
Prior to and during trial, the process of criminal justice in Florida is
characterized by procedures designed to protect the rights of the accused.'
His safeguards include protection from illegal search and seizure,2 double
jeopardy, 3 self-incrimination, 4 and right to a speedy trial by jury.5 Furthermore, he is entitled to counsel; 6 he has a right in most cases to bail;7 and
he is entitled to appeal as a matter of course.8
1. Cf. FLA. CONST. art. I, §16. In fact, a frequent criticism of courts among laymen
is that there is more concern for the rights of criminals than for the rights of society as
a whole. See, e.g., U.S. Nxws & WoR.LD REPORT, Dec. 9, 1968, at 78; U.S. NEws & WoRLD
REPORT, July 22, 1968, at 45. But see Note, Gideon, Escobedo, Miranda: Begrudging Acceptance of the United States Supreme Court's Mandates in Florida, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 346
(1969).
2. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §12.
3. FLA. CONsr. art. I, §9.
4. Id.
5. FLA. CONsT. art. I, §16.
6. Id.
7. FLA. CONST. art. I, §14.
8. FiA. STAT. §924.06 (1969).
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Despite the considerable protections afforded the defendant throughout
the guilt-determining process, the defendant finds himself subject to the
widest latitude of judicial discretion when punishment is determined. Since
guilt is not disputed in the majority of cases, punishment is often the sole
issue before the court.9 Once guilt is established, the trial judge exercises
almost unlimited discretion that is not subject to appellate review in either the
federal court system or in most states, including Florida.O No other country in
the free world permits a trial judge such unbridled discretion.1U This note

will trace the development of the rule prohibiting appellate review of legal
but excessive sentences, examine the arguments for and against such review,
and recommend proposals concerning appellate review of sentences in
Florida.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE AGAINST APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

Early American criminal procedure followed the English practice2 of
discharging a defendant entirely if an appellate court determined that his

sentence was illegal.

3

Such a windfall was ill suited to the American sense

of justice, however, and the practice was soon discarded.4 Today, it is
9. ABA STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENcEs §1.2, comment at 1
(Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS] states that in some jurisdictions as
high as 90% of criminal convictions result from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. In
other jurisdictions it is as low as 70%. The figure for Florida is 89%. FLORmA PAROLE AND
PROBATION COMMITrEE, ANNUAL REPORT at 39 (June 80, 1970).
10. STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 1. Currently 18 states have appellate review of sentences:
ALASKA STAT. §12.55.120 (Supp. 1969); Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-1717 (b)

(1956); ARK. STAT.

ANN. §27-2144 (1947); CAL. PENAL CODE §1237 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §51-196
(1958); HAWAu REv. LAws §212-14 (1968); IDAHo CODE §19-2821 (1947); IOWA CODE §793.18
(1966); ME. REV. STAT. Ann. tit. 15, §§2141-44 (1964); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 132-38 (1966);
MASS. GEN. ANN. LAws ch. 278, §28 (B) (1956); Nm. REv. STAT. §29-2308 (1956); State v.
Johnson, 67 NJ. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (Super. Ct. 1961); N.Y. CODE QUM. PRoc. §543
(1964); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §1066 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §138.050 (1955); PA. STAT. tit 17,
§41 (1936); TENN. CODE ANN. §40-2704 (1956).
11. George, An Unsolved Problem: Comparative Sentencing Techniques, 45 A.B.A.J.
250, 251 (1959); Comment, Judicial Review -Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentences,
46 IowA L. REv. 159, 165 (1960).
12. For centuries, English criminal law involved an unwritten rule prohibiting any
review of a criminal trial. Only when the Crown, acting as both the prosecutor and issuer
of writs of error, decided that the trial was unsatisfactory did the defendant gain the
privilege of appeal. T. PLucKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 213 (5th ed.
1956). The hesitancy of common law jurists to reverse a conviction upon review presumably
stemmed from the fact that reversal necessarily resulted in complete discharge of the
defendant. See, e.g., King v. Bourne, 7 Ad. & E. 58, 112 Eng. Rep. 893 (1837); King v. Ellis,
5 B. & C. 395, 108 Eng. Rep. 147 (1826). The English appellate courts also disclaimed

any power to modify a sentence or remand the case for imposition of a legal sentence. See
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND.
L. REv. 671, 673 (1962). Thus, if the sentence were illegal, the only alternative was to
discharge the defendant.
13. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. 419 (1841); Elliott v. People, 13 Mich.
365 (1865).
14. See, e.g., Salazar v. United States, 236 F. 541 (8th Cir. 1916); Kennedy v. State,
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widely accepted that a sentence that exceeds statutory limits may either be
modified by an appellate court or remanded for resentencing. 5 Most courts
have steadfastly refused, however, to disturb a sentence that, although within
statutory limits, is obviously excessive or harsh under the circumstances.-G
In Florida, an unauthorized sentence may be remanded by an appellate
court for a proper sentence.1 7 However, if the sentence is within statutory
limits, the Florida supreme court has ruled that the question of excessive8
ness rests with the board of pardons rather than with the appellate courts.
Proscription of appellate review of legal sentences has not always been
the rule, however. In 1942 the Supreme Court of Florida held in two different cases' 9 that the punishments imposed were so severe under the circumstances as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In both cases
the sentences imposed were within statutory limits, yet were deemed excessive
by the court.
The supreme court expressly overruled this position the following year
by holding in Brown v. State20 that a sentence within statutory limits does
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment no matter how harsh it may
seem. Therefore, if a statute is constitutional, any punishment within the
statutory limits cannot be held excessive "for the reason that the power to
declare what punishment may be assessed against those convicted of crime is
not a judicial power, but a legislative power, controlled only by the provisions of the Constitution." 2' The court reiterated that the only recourse for
one whose sentence appears excessive is an appeal to the board of pardons to
exercise its power of commutation. 22 Accordingly, Florida appellate courts
have

consistently refused

to review sentences within statutory

although at times admitting the apparent severity of the sentence.

limits, 23

24

62 Ind. 1386 (1878); Moore v. Parole Bd., 379 Mich. 624, 154 N.W.2d 437 (1967); State v.
Garton, 102 N.J.L. 318, 133 A. 403 (1926).
15. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 89 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
700 (1937); Johnson v. United States, 32 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1929); Warbington v. State, 234
Miss. 743, 107 So. 2d 578 (1958); Wright v. State, 123 Tex. Crim. 536, 59 S.W.2d 155 (1933).
See also L. OPFrnLD, CRIMINAL APPEFA.s IN AMmucA 101-02 (1939).
16. E.g., Michell v. State, 154 So. 2d 701 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 19683); State v. Wright, 261 N.C.
356, 134 S.E.2d 624 (1964); Mason v. State, 375 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
17. Irvin v. State, 52 Fla. 51, 41 So. 785 (1906).
18. Green v. State, 121 Fla. 307, 163 So. 712 (1935).
19. Allred v. State, 151 Fla. 586, 10 So. 2d 131 (1942); Nowling v. State, 151 Fla. 584,
10 So. 2d 130 (1942). In both Allred and Nowling the court reversed per curiam where
the penalty given was three years in the penitentiary for concealing one gallon of moonshine whiskey on which the state tax had not been paid.
20. 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943). Defendant Brown, like Allred and Nowling,
was convicted for concealing alcoholic beverages on which the state tax had not been paid.
His punishment was seven years.
21. Id. at 858, 13 So. 2d at 461.
22. Id.
23. Davis v. State, 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960); Hultey v. State, 94 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1957);
Michell v. State, 154 So. 2d 701 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Rohdin v. State, 105 So. 2d 371 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
24. Cf., e.g., Stanford v. State, 110 So. 2d I (Fla. 1959) (defendants, ages 17, 17, and 18,
received sentences of 8, 6, and 10 years respectively for armed robbery where the amount
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In Florida, prior to 1970, a defendant could appeal "a sentence, on the
ground that it is excessive or ilegal."25 This authorization for appellate review was only illusory, however. "Excessive" was judicially interpreted as referring not to excessiveness in the particular circumstances of the defendant's
situation, but rather to punishment in excess of or in addition to that prescribed by law.26 Thus viewed, a sentence is excessive only when it exceeds
the punishment prescribed by statute.27 In addition, another Florida statute
28
provides:
The court, on an appeal, shall examine the record, and reverse or
affimn the judgment, sentence, or decree of the court below; give
such judgment, sentence, or decree as the court below should have
given; or otherwise as to it may appear according to law.
The Florida supreme court stated in Florida Real Estate Commission v.
Rogers,29 however, that it had never construed this statute as authorizing an
appellate court to reduce a sentence. The court held that without more explicit legislative authorization to review sentences, judicial assumption of

that prerogative would be an invasion of the legislative power.3 0
Although Florida law clearly precludes appellate review of sentences, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that sentence review may be a

involved was only $5); Hultey v. State, 94 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1957) (a 21-year-old with
limited schooling and no previous record of law violations was given .20 years for a conviction of manslaughter based on "culpable negligence," i.e., failing to stop at a railroad
crossing, which resulted in the death of two passengers); Chavigny v. State, 163 So. 2d
47 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1964) (court held it had no power to review the sentences of a defendant
given two consecutive life imprisonment sentences for conviction of two second degree
murder offenses); Rohdin v. State, 105 So. 2d 371 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (appellate court
refused to upset a sentence of 5 years for manslaughter in an auto accident case where the
defendant was a 75-year-old man who 5 years earlier had suffered a heart attack).
25. FLA. STAT. §924.06(4) (1969) (emphasis added).
26. Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
27. In effect, then, a defendant has the right to appeal "a sentence, on the grounds
that it is illegal or illegal." This is the literal interpretation given to FLA. STAT. §924.06 (4)
(1969) in Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542, 544 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). The court determined
that the phrase "excessive or illegal" used the conjunctive "or" to join two aspects of the
same entity rather than two separate entities. Thus, "excessive" and "illegal" are one and
the same. Id. The 1970 Florida Legislature codified this interpretation by amending
§924.06 to allow a defendant to appeal "[a] sentence, on the ground that it is illegal." FLA.
STAT. §924.06 (1) (d) (Supp. 1970).
28. FLA. STAT. §59.34 (1969) (emphasis added).
29. 176 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1965).
30. Id. at 67. One of the anomalies of Florida law is that although review of sentences
for misdemeanors and felonies is not available, a municipal court conviction for an ordinance
violation may be appealed to the circuit court, which has discretionary power to reduce the
municipal court sentence. FLA. STAT. §932.52(13) (1969) provides in part: "(12) The
circuit court . . . shall . . . reverse or affirm the judgment appealed from, giving such
judgment or order as the trial court should have given .... The circuit court shall have
power to lower the sentence imposed by the municipal court if in his discretion the same
should be lowered."
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part of due process during the appellate stage. In North Carolinav. Pearce,31
the Court held that a trial judge imposing a more severe sentence upon a
second trial than upon the initial adjudication must express the factual basis
for the increased sentence.3 2 Obviously, one purpose of this rule is to enable
the appellate court to review the sentencing discretion of the trial court,
at least for this special type of situation. Pearce indicates an increased
awareness that a defendant's rights must be guarded as closely during the
sentencing process as during the guilt determining process, and that such safeguards are valueless unless the sentencing discretion of the judge is subject
3
to meaningful review on appeal .
PROS AND CONS OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

Eliminationof Disparity
A principal argument in favor of appellate review of sentences is that
it could eliminate, or at least reduce, disparity in sentencing. Disparity is a
cause of unrest among prisoners who view grossly unequal sentences for the
same crime as evidence of an arbitrary system of justice.34 In addition to
hindering prisoner rehabilitation, 5 sentencing disparity can have far wider
effects. As one writer has noted: "It manifests the failure of the system to
achieve the goal of equal justice under law. When it becomes notorious, it is
likely to undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal
justice."386
Elimination of disparity does not mean that everyone convicted of the
same crime should receive the same sentence. Rather, it means that those
convicted of similar crimes under similar conditions and with relatively
similar backgrounds should receive approximately the same punishment.
As Judge Sobeloff37 has pointed out:38

81.

395 US. 711 (1969).

82. Id. at 726.
8. This interpretation of Pearce is one of the two arguments used by petitioner in
Wailer v. State, 897 U.S. 887 (1970). See also Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing:
From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 25, 48 (1970). The authors state
that perhaps the greatest significance of Pearce may be that it embodies an implicit recognition by the Supreme Court that sentencing decisions can be rationally justified and that
the basis for the sentence can be specified.
34. Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Study, 69
YArL L.J. 1453, 1460 (1960).

85.

STANDARDS,

86.

R.

SENTENCE

87.

supra note 9, at 25.

DAWsoN,

SENTENCING:

THE DESIGN

AS

TO

TYPE,

LENGTH,

AND

CONDITION

OF

215 (1969).

Judge Simon E. Sobeloff sits on the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth

Circuit (Chief Judge, 1958-1964) and was Solicitor General of the United States, 1954-1955.
He is also Chairman of the Advisory Committee on sentencing and review for the ABA
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice.
88. Appellate Review of Sentences, A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 82 F.R.D. 249, 278 (1962).
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Now what is sought is not absolute uniformity, but a uniformly fair
and equitable approach. It's quite beyond legislative ingenuity to
invent a slot machine that will dispense automatic justice . ...

No

one will argue for the elimination of thinking and feeling from the
administration of justice, but it would seem that the toughness of
the problem is no reason to bar reexamination; rather it is a ground
for favoring it.
The purpose of appellate review of sentences, therefore, is not to enforce
uniformity of sentences where rational grounds for differentiation exist, but
rather to achieve relatively similar sentencing where reasonable grounds
for differentiation do not exist. 39
It is clear that disparity of sentences exists nationwide. In 1959, for example, the crime of forgery was punished in the federal courts of western
Arkansas and western Oklahoma with average sentences of 58 and 63 months
respectively, while Maine and southern New York averaged only 9 months.40
Convictions for auto theft brought sentences averaging over 46 months in
federal courts in Iowa, but only 11 months in the western district of New
York.-' State courts follow a similar pattern. In Vermont, the average prison
term served by all felons was 9 months, compared with 31 months in Illinois.42
Rape sentences averaged 40 months in New York but only 19 months in
neighboring New Jersey. 43 Those convicted of homicide serve an average of
12 years in Ohio, but less than 3 years in Texas. 44 Furthermore, a defendant
may have as high as an 84.2 per cent chance of probation in some jurisdictions or as low as an 8.4 per cent chance in others. 45
Although statistics are not yet available to compare sentences given in
the various circuits in Florida, the commissioners of the Florida Parole and
Probation Commission, who review the records of all prisoners sentenced to
Florida state prisons, feel that disparity exists among Florida judges in the
exercise of their sentencing discretion. 4" Data revealing a different type of
sentencing disparity is available, however. From 1940 to 1964, 54 men were
sentenced to death in Florida for convictions of rape.47 Despite the fact that
132 Caucasians were convicted of rape during that period, as compared to
152 Negroes, only 6 of the 54 sentenced to death were Caucasian.48 The small
difference in the number of convictions does not explain a death sentence
39. Kennedy, Justice is Found in the Hearts and Minds of Free Men, 25 FE. PROB.,
Dec. 1961, at 3.
40. 110 CoNG. Rzc. 20367 (1965) (remarks of James V. Bennett, former Director,
United States Bureau of Prisons).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45.
46.
bation
47.

Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 Fn. PROB., Dec. 1956, at 15, 17-18.
Interview with Raymond B. Marsh, Commissioner of the Florida Parole and ProCommission, in Tallahassee, Florida, March 22, 1971.
Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D.

55, 67 (1966).
48. Id.
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ratio for blacks of eight times that of whites. Furthermore, the execution rate
is even more startling: of the 6 whites sentenced to death only one was actually
executed, whereas 29 of the 48 Negroes were executed.49
A recent survey of judges in criminal courts in Florida revealed mixed
opinions on the presence of disparity in sentencing.50 Some seem to believe
that disparity does not exist,-' while others admit it does exist since each
judge applies personal standards in formulating sentences. 52 Still others feel
that if disparity does exist at the time of sentencing, it will be corrected by
the parole commission. 5 Some judges expressed a degree of apathy as to
whether disparity of sentences exists in Florida, 5" which is surprising in view
of the growing consensus that elimination of disparity in sentencing can
facilitate rehabilitation and improve respect for the law. 55
One of the more serious consequences of sentence disparity is that it
casts grave doubts on the judicial system's ability to achieve the standards of
due process that should characterize American courts.55 As former United
States Attorney General Robert Jackson said: 5 7
It is ... repugnant to one's sense of justice that the judgment meted
out to an offender should be dependent in large part on a purely
fortuitous circumstance, namely the personality of the particular
judge before whom the case happens to come for disposition.
Sentencing as a Matter of Discretionwith the Trial Judge
The most frequent argument against appellate review of sentences is
that sentencing is, and should be, a matter of discretion for the trial judge

49. Id. The Florida supreme court was not impressed by these statistics, however. It
stated "all these statistics show is that more Negroes have been tried and convicted for
rape than white defendants." Thomas v. State, 92 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. 1957).
50. The author sent a questionnaire to selected circuit court judges and all judges
in criminal courts of record. The questions asked and the results of the survey are in the
Appendix.
51. One of the judges responding to the questionnaire [hereinafter cited as Survey]
stated that if a defendant had no prior record, a judge would tend to sentence an individual
near the average for all persons convicted of the same crime.
52. One judge admitted that different judges give different weight to the same sentencing factors. Another judge stated that each judge has his own idiosyncracies in sentencing. See Appendix.
53. Several judges stated that appellate review of sentences on the ground of excessiveness was unnecessary since the parole commission performs this function. See notes 105-109
infra and accompanying text.
54. One judge responding to question No. 4 in the Appendix regarding opportunity
to compare sentences, stated that the sentences other judges imposed were irrelevant since
each judge has his own idiosyncrades in sentencing and would disregard any uniform
criteria in sentencing on different crimes.
55. STANDARDS, supra note 9, §1.2, comment at 25-26.
56. P. DAWSON, supra note 36, at 15-16.
57. US. ATr'Y GEN. REPORT FOR THE FIScAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1940, at 5-6 (1940),
also cited in Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 FED. PROB., Dec. 1956, at 15, 17.
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based upon his experience with the facts and circumstances of the case. 58
Most judges questioned stated that the appellate court would be limited to
a "cold" record upon which to base a modification of the sentence, whereas
the trial court is personally involved with all aspects of the trial and is in a
better position to exercise discretion in sentencing. 59
Although it is generally uncontroverted that the sentencing process requires the exercise of broad discretionary power, the basic question is: Why
is sentencing not subject to review while review is provided in virtually
every other area of the law when the trial court exercises discretion? 0 For
example, whether a witness is competent is a matter of discretion with the
judge, but such discretion may be reversed by an appellate court if abused81
Likewise, the amount of damages awarded in a civil case is largely within
the discretion of the trier of fact, 62 but the exercise of such discretion is
clearly reviewable by an appellate court.6 Discretion exercised in sentencing
should similarly be subject to review,4 particularly since sentencing is perhaps the most important aspect of the criminal process.65 The power of
sentencing is too delicate and too consequential to be placed, entirely unsupervised, in the hands of one man. 8 "In no other role can a judge so
freely impose a pattern of his personal reactions, philosophy and animosity
87
as when he sentences a man who has no right of appeal [of the sentence]."
One major cause of sentencing disparity is that the discretionary nature
of sentencing allows judges to develop and apply their own sentencing criteria.
Each judge employs some type of mental process in which certain factors are
weighed heavily while others are discarded or given minimal weight in
reaching the final decision. Over a period of time a judge develops certain
criteria that are used in most cases to formulate the sentence. 6 For example,
four Florida judges responding to the survey listed the mental attitude of
the defendant as the second most important factor in determining the
sentence, whereas several others said it was of no consideration at all.8 9
Although four judges listed the defendant's prior record as the most important factor in determining the sentence and eight others ranked it second,
58. This argument was used more than any other by the judges responding to the

survey. See Appendix.
59. Survey, see Appendix.
60. Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences,
15 VAne. L. REV. 671, 684 (1962).
61. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Robinson, 68 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1953).
62. See, e.g., Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. Magoffin, 100 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1958);
Standard Oil Co. v. Dunagan, 171 So. 2d 622 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957); Wise v. Jacksonville
Gas Corp., 97 So. 2d 704 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
63. See, e.g., Renuart Lumber Yards v. Levine, 49 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1950).
64. Mueller, supra note 60, at 684.
65. The Supreme Court recognized the critical nature of sentencing in Mempa v. Rhay,
589 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
66. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 38, at 268 (remarks by Judge Sobeloff).
67. Id.
68. See generally Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation,
in OF PRISONS AND JUsMrIC, S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
69. Survey, see Appendix.
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one judge felt that six other considerations were more important. 0 One
judge considered the most important factor in sentencing to be the causes
of the defendant's behavior in committing the crime.71 Such a consideration
is likely to lead to different results than if the most important factor were
the defendant's prior record or the nature of the crime. Since the criteria
used by different judges vary considerably, two cases similar in all respects,
including the background and previous record of the defendants, can yield
vastly different sentences for the same offense.
One of the primary goals of appellate review of sentences would be to
develop more uniform criteria for the judge to apply in exercising his discretion in sentencing.7 2 Thus, appellate review of sentences would not eliminate the judge's discretion, but would encourage the use of more uniform criteria in the application of that discretion. Since, at present, the factors that
lead to a particular sentence are often indeterminable 73 the experience and
knowledge of an outstanding judge in the area of sentencing is rarely preserved for future judges, or even for his contemporaries. This experience
would be preserved through the establishment of sentencing criteria, howand knowledge of
ever, and each judge could benefit from the experience
4
other judges, just as is done in other areas of the law.7
Ability of the Appellate Court To Determine the Correctnessof the
Sentence from the Record on Appeal
One objection to appellate review of sentences, which has been voiced
by Florida judges as well as those in other jurisdictions, is that the appellate
court cannot determine from the cold record on appeal whether a proper
sentence was given, or what the proper sentence should be.75 In the vast
majority of cases guilt is determined by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.76
Excluding presentence investigation reports, the trial court in those cases
has no information concerning the defendant that is not also available to
the appellate court. The fact that the trial judge had opportunity to briefly

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 28-29.
73. Id.
74. The benefit of established sentencing criteria would seem to be particularly valuable
to a new judge. As Mr. Justice McCardle, an English jurist, is reported to have said:
"Anyone can try a case. That is as easy as falling off a log. The difficulty comes in
knowing what to do with a man once he has been found guilty." Quoted in Sobeloff, The
Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955). The
judge would benefit from the knowledge that his judgment would be reviewed in the
more difficult cases since errors committed in sentencing may be more grave than those
committed during any other part of the trial. Id.
75. See, e.g., Brewster, Appellate Review of Sentences, 40 F.R.D. 79, 82 (1965); SrAmkms,
supra note 9, at 5; Survey, see Appendix.
76. STANmARO, supra note 9, at 1. Seventy to 90% are disposed of in this manner nationwide, 89% in Florida. See note 9 supra.
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observe the defendant at arraignment should not preclude the appellate
court from reviewing the sentence because-it has not observed the "demeanor"
of the defendant77

At present, all information available to the trial court is not passed to
the appellate court since presentence investigation reports are not included
in the record on appeal.78 Whether the contents of the presentence investi-

gation report should be revealed to the defendant is beyond the scope of
this note,79 but the appellate court in reviewing a sentence should have access
to this information to the same extent as the trial court8

0

By including the presentence investigation report in the record on appeal,
the appellate court would have access to all the information available to the
trial court when the sentence was formulated except for personal observation of the defendant. The demeanor of the defendant, however, is apparently
of relatively minor importance in formulating the sentence. 8 ' The most im-

portant factors are the nature of the offense, the defendant's prior record,
and the contents of the presentence investigation report,8 2 all of which could
be made available to the appellate court. Even assuming that the demeanor

77. See Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 38, at 275.
78. Stanford v. State, 110 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1959); FLA. STAT. §924.32 (1969).
79. Whether presentence investigation reports should be revealed to the parties has
been a matter of frequent debate. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING
(Approved Draft 1968); Guzman, Defendant's Access to
ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
Presentence Reports in Federal Criminal Courts, 52 IowA L. REv. 161 (1966); Lorensen,
The Disclosure to Defense of Presentence Reports in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. RV. 159
(1967); Roche, The Position for Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29
ALUANY L. Rxv. 206 (1965); Thomsen, Confidentiality of the Presentence Report: A Middle
Position, 28 FED. PRoB., March 1964, at 8.

The Florida position on disclosure of presentence investigation reports is clear. Disclosure is prohibited by FLA. STAT. §945.10 (1969). The report is considered confidential
and only the sentencing judge has access to it. Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d 308 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1962). There appear to be cogent constitutional arguments, however, for requiring the
state to reveal to the defendant the information affecting the sentence. In Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967), the Supreme Court established that sentencing is a "critical stage"
in criminal proceedings. Referring to another critically important procedure, waiver of
jurisdiction by a juvenile court, the Court stated in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 562
(1966): "There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to staff reports. If a
decision on waiver is 'critically important' it is equally of 'critical importance' that the
material submitted to the judge ...

be subjected ...

to examination, criticism and refu-

tation." Such language would seem to be equally appropriate regarding sentencing since the
factor necessitating review in Kent was the "critical nature" of waiver proceedings.
For a good discussion of disclosure of presentence investigation reports see ABA STANDARDS RELATING To SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 214-25 (Approved Draft 1968).

80. This is recommended by the ABA House of Delegates. STANDARDS, supra note 9,
§2.3, comment at ili.
81. This conclusion is derived from the relative weight given to the various sentencing
factors by Florida judges in the survey. See Appendix. See also Appellate Review of Sentences, Hearings on S-2722 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76 (1966) (statement of Judge Weigel, cited in STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 44,
82. Survey, see Appendix.
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of the defendant is considered in formulating the sentence, its reliability as
a sentencing factor is questionable. As one trial judge has stated: 8
My admiration for my brothers on the federal trial bench throughout
the country and for their exceptional insights into human beings is
second to none. But it has not convinced me that they or I possess
some wholly unique capacity to make the punishment fit the crime
because of their or my personal observation of a defendant during
the course of his trial.
The benefit of observing the defendant during trial should not be considered
so important as to impair the correction of harsh and excessive sentences.
Although unable to observe the defendant in court, the appellate court
does possess certain advantages over the trial court. It can take a more detached and objective view of the proceedings than can a trial judge. The
appellate court is removed from the "emotional overtones from which even
a conscientious trial judge may find it difficult to escape when he imposes
sentence shortly after hearing of the defendant's outrageous conduct"8' The
appellate court is also removed from community pressures to set "examples"
to stem a rising crime rate or other pressures that can arise from prejudice
or circumstance within a particular community. These advantages would
appear to be at least as important as observing the defendant in court. In
any event, the purpose of appellate review of sentences would not be to
review in detail every sentence rendered, 5 but rather to modify those clearly
out of line with prevailing notions of justice s 6 The record on appeal, including the presentence investigation report, would contain sufficient information to determine whether a sentence is obviously excessive.
The Possibilityof FrivolousAppeals

Many judges fear that the right to appeal a sentence would prompt many
frivolous appeals, adding to an already overburdened calendar. 87 This fear

has not materialized in jurisdictions where appellate review of sentences has
83. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 81, at 75-76 (statement by Judge Weigel).
See also Blatt, He Saw the Witnesses, 38 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 86 (1954).
84. Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There be Appellate Review?, 41

A.B.A.J. 13, 17 (1955).
85. See Note, Judicial Review -Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentence, 46 IOWA

L. Rxv. 159,166 (1960).
86. English courts have stated their policy on when to modify a sentence: "It is only
when a sentence appears to err in principle that the Court will alter it. If a sentence is
excessive or inadequate to such an extent as to satisfy this Court that when it was passed
there was a failure to apply the right principles, then this Court will intervene." Meador,
The Review of Criminal Sentences in England, A Report Submitted to the American Bar
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, appended to the STANDARDS,
supra note 9, at 125.
87. STANDmARS, supra note 9, at 5. This objection was also mentioned by several judges
responding to the Survey.
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been instituted,s however, and there is no reason to anticipate problems
in Florida.
In response to assertions of possible frivolous appeals, two provisions
have been suggested to insure against that possibility. The first suggestion
is that some limitation be put on sentences that could be appealed. There
is considerable room for disagreement as to what the limit should be,89 but
a feasible limit would perhaps be sentences of one year or more.90 Experience
could dictate whether this minimum should be raised, lowered, or eliminated
at a future time. A second and more controversial provision that might discourage frivolous appeals would be to empower the appellate court to increase as well as to decrease the sentence on appeal. 91
Excessive leniency contributes to disparity just as does excessive harshness.
Thus, to effectively eliminate disparity it may be advisable to initially grant
the power to increase the sentence.9 2 Again, if experience showed that the
power to increase the sentence did not contribute to eliminating disparity or
discouraging frivolous appeals, it could also be changed9 Such provisions
would at least tend to assuage those who anticipate a flood of frivolous appeals once the right to appeal sentences is granted.
Frivolous appeals may actually be less of a problem when appellate review
of sentences is available than it is without it. Many appellate courts today
are congested with appeals based on questionable issues or some technicality
in the law when the real issue may well be the severity of the sentence. 94
Not only must appellate tribunals sometimes take a strained interpretation
of the law to avoid a Draconian sentence given in the court below, but the
strained construction given to the law in such cases may work havoc in future
cases.'5
Finally, the argument that appellate review of sentences would cause
frivolous appeals and overburden the court avoids the real issue. As United
States Representative Emanual Celler has stated: "This objection completely
88. See, e.g., Appellate Review of Sentences, A Symposium at the judicial Conference
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 306 (1962)
(statement by Justice G. Miller Hyde, Court of Queen's Bench, Montreal, Canada); Note,
Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J.

1453 (1960).
89. The committee that authored the STANDARDS was itself unable to agree on a specific
figure. STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 20.
90.

Cf. CONN. STAT. ANN. §51-195 (1958).

91. This provision was the most controversial to the authors of STANDARDS. The Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review and The Special Committee on Minimum
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice were unable to reach agreement on
whether sentences could be increased as well as decreased if appealed by. the defendant.
STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 55.
92. For a contrary argument, see STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 54.

93. After almost 60 years experience with appellate review of sentences the English
decided that the provision to increase was not necessary. Meador, supra note 86, at 140-45,
157.
94. See Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 88, qt 271 (remaqts by Judge

Sobeloft).
95. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/4
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evades the issue of whether an appeals procedure is needed to insure the
quality of justice that should characterize our courts."'9 6
Interferencewith the PardonPower of the Executive
A surprising number of commentators opposed to appellate review of
sentences have argued that such review would infringe on the pardon power
of the executive. This reasoning was expressed by the Supreme Court of
Florida in Brown v. StateP7 Florida courts have consistently stated 98 that the
avenue for reducing a sentence is the Parole and Probation Commission, 99 or
the Board of Pardons for executive demency 0 0
Although executive clemency has occasionally prevented the execution of
an unduly harsh sentence,:'0 this should be an exceptional method of sentence reduction since "the administration of justice is inherently the responsibility of the courts . . . . The sentence is the very substance of
justice."'I 02 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina
v. Pearce03 placed the responsibility on appellate courts for determining
whether valid reasons existed for an increased sentence on a second trial for
the same offense. This would seem to indicate that sentence review is inherently the responsibility of appellate courts rather than an executive agency.
Several Florida judges stated they did not think appellate review of
sentences was necessary, particularly when an indeterminate sentence is given,
since this is accomplished by the parole board.04 There are several reasons
why the Florida Parole Board cannot fully compensate for appellate review.
First, the parole board gives greater weight to personal background of the
defendant, such as marital status and employment. 05 The courts, by comparison, appear to give primary weight to the nature of the offense, the defendant's prior record, and the presentence investigation report. 06 Second,
07
the parole board considers the behavior of the defendant while in prison.
If the prisoner receives an indeterminate sentence, he may serve a longer
sentence due to inability to adjust to prison life than would normally be
given for a similar crime. Thus, actions subsequent to the time of the trial
96. Id. at 309 (exhibit by Congressman Celler).
97. 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943).
98. E.g., Stanford v. State, 110 So. 2d I (Fla. 1959); Hultey v. State, 94 So. 2d 815 (Fla.
1957); Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d 542 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Michell v. State, 154 So. 2d
701 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
99. See F.A. STAT. §947.16 (1969).
100. See FrA. STAT. §940.01 (1969).
101. See, e.g., Kennedy, Justice Is Found in the Hearts and Minds of Free Men, 25
FED. PROB, Dec. 1961, at 3,4.
102. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 88, at 309 (exhibit by Congressman
Celler).

103. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
104. Survey, see Appendix.
105. Interview with Raymond B. Marsh, Commissioner of the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, in Tallahassee, Florida, March 22, 1971.

106. Survey, see Appendix.
107. Interview, supra note 105.
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may increase the maximum sentence served by a defendant. Additionally,
where an indeterminate sentence is given, the prisoner is unsure of his date
of release. He must consider, at least initially, the maximum imposed as his
08
sentence and this may hinder rehabilitation efforts.
Perhaps the best reply to the argument that appellate review of sentences
infringes on the executive's pardon power, however, was stated by an Oklahoma court:109
The one [appellate court modifying a sentence] is an award of justice
and the other [commutation of sentence by the executive] is an act of
grace. Commutation is a matter of discretion and may be refused. Justice is imperative and must not be denied.
Goals of Appellate Review of Sentences
A system of appellate review of sentences offers certain advantages and
benefits to criminal justice in Florida. Prior to discussing specific proposals
for Florida, it would be beneficial to state the goals of such a system. Hopefully, appellate review of sentences would:
(1) reduce the number of sentences that are dearly excessive upon
facts and circumstances of the case and the background of the defendant,
and that are not in accord with prevailing notions of justice and fair
0
play;"1
(2) facilitate rehabilitation of the defendant and respect for the law
by countering the impression of many convicted criminals that the sentence awarded depended more on the personal predilictions of the judge
than on the substantive aspects of the case;"'L
(3) develop state-wide criteria for formulating sentences in order to
improve the rationality of the sentencing process and insure that all defendants throughout the state are subject to the same standards in sentencing;"12 and
(4) focus the efforts of the appellate court on the sentence when that is
the primary purpose of the appeal."13
PROPOSAL

Appellate review of sentences is a needed reform in Florida's system of
criminal justice. Accordingly, the following recommendations are submitted
regarding such review:

108. Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 88, at 314.
109. Fritz v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 342, 343, 128 P. 170, 171 (1912).

110. See notes 34-49 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 94-95 supraand accompanying text.
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(1) Appellate review shall be available as a matter of right to any
14
defendant sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.
This proposal is included to meet objections that appellate review of
sentences would encourage a large number of frivolous appeals. A one-year
minimum would allow review of the more severe sentences where the most
lasting harm could result from an unduly harsh sentence.
(2) The trial record must include a statement by the trial judge of
the reasonsfor the particularsentence imposed.
Although most Florida judges surveyed do not wish to state their reasons
for the sentence given, 1 5 some explanation is required if rational sentencing
criteria are to be developed throughout the state. A statement of reasons can
be beneficial in several ways. First, the requirement that the reason for the
sentence be articulated should cause the judge to reflect more upon the
cogent reasons for a sentence given," 6 thus contributing to a greater degree
of rationality in sentencing."17 Second, it will be a valuable, if not essential,
aid to the reviewing court.118 Without the benefit of the trial court's experience in sentencing, rational sentencing criteria will not easily be developed.
This requirement need not be an inordinate burden on the trial court.
A statement for the record at the time of sentencing should suffice in most
cases to indicate the factors that led to the- sentence imposed. Where the trial
court feels it would be inappropriate or harmful to the defendant to state
the reasons for the sentence in his presence, a written statement explaining
such reasons could be attached to the record on appeal.
In short, the judge is merely making known the thought processes that
have already occurred as he formulated the sentence. Whatever slight burden this requirement places on the trial court should be more than offset by
its benefit to rational statewide sentencing. As one writer has noted: "Where
no reasons are given [for the sentence] the individual may be forgiven for
114. Most commentators and the ABA

STANDAmDS

committee agree that the state should

not have the right to appeal the sentence. Presently, in Florida the state may only appeal
a sentence on the ground that it is illegal. FA.
and accompanying text.

STAT.

§924.07 (1969). See notes 17-30 supra

115. Survey, see Appendix, question 6. Only one judge responding felt that there
may be some merit in requiring the judge to state the reasons for the sentence.

116.

STANDARDS,

supra note 9, at 45-46

117. But see Appellate Review of Sentences, supra note 88, at 284 (statement by Judge
Walsh): "I don't think most judges would like to write all of the reasons why they have
imposed sentence. Actually, what I think you'll find is that they can develop the best

rationalization in the world for almost anything if they think about it awhile. And that's
what you're going to get. You are going to get rationalization for what a judge did and
I doubt that you're going to get a very deep and thoughtful reflective statement of his
actual reasons for sentence. His published reasons will soon be no more than a pious

stereotyped form."
118. STANDAmS, supra note 9, at 47.
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concluding that he has been the victim of an arbitrary decision.

119

(3) The complete record of the trial and presentence investigation report, as well as any other documents or records used in sentencing, shall
be forwarded to the reviewing court. The appellate court shall have the
power to order a presentence investigation if one has not been made.
Appellate review of sentences would be difficult under present Florida
law since the appellate court receives insufficient information regarding the
defendant to adequately review the sentence. 12 The inclusion of the presentence investigation report and other documents or records used in sentencing, in conjunction with the statement of reasons for the sentence given,
should provide sufficient information for the reviewing court to determine
the propriety of the sentence.
(4) The appellate court shall have the power to increase the sentence
awarded, or reduce it, or otherwise modify it if the defendant has appealed
the sentence, or the reviewing court may remand it to the trial court with
instructions to increase or decrease the sentence or otherwise modify it.
The purpose of this provision is twofold. First, the proposal is designed to
aid in reducing sentence disparity. A sentence that is too lenient contributes to
sentence disparity just as does the excessively harsh one. Accordingly, the
appellate court should have power to increase an excessively lenient sentence
just as it may decrease an excessively harsh sentence.' 21 Second, the possibility
of an increased sentence would discourage frivolous appeals by those who
have already received a lenient sentence, but who might otherwise appeal
thinking that they have nothing to lose.
(5) The reviewing court, upon determining that a sentence should be
reduced or increased or upon remanding it to the trial court, must include
a statement of the reasons for modifying the sentence or for remanding it
to the trial court for resentencing.
This provision is perhaps the critical factor in developing rational statewide sentencing criteria. The appellate court must explain the basis for its
modification or remand, and state the principles that it used to modify the
sentence, or indicate the principles that the trial court should use in formulating the sentence on remand. Only with specific, well-reasoned guidance
from the appellate courts will consistent state-wide criteria develop at the trial
22
court level. 2
119. Thomas, Sentencing-The Case for Reasoned Decisions, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 243,
245.
120. The presentence investigation report is not included in the record on appeal. See
notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
121. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §51-196 (1958); MASs. Ga. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, §28 (b)
(1956); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 148, §32 (1964).
122. Although it is beyond the scope of this note, a significant question arises at this

point. What standards should the appellate court use to determine whether a sentence is
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss4/4

16

Bloodworth:
Appellate
Review ofLAW
Sentences
in Florida: A Proposal
[Vol. XXIII
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
REVIEW
CONCLUSION

The broad protection afforded the rights of the criminally accused in
Florida is largely illusory for the vast majority who merely pause momentarily on their way to prison to plead guilty and waive trial. 123 To such persons, as well as those convicted at trial, the most important aspect of criminal
justice often becomes an exercise in discretion by one man. The sentencing
24
judge may have options that range from probation to life imprisonment
with little to guide him but his conscience and whose decision is not even
subject to the benefit of review by an appellate court. 12 5 Perhaps in no other
situation in our society does one man exercise such complete control over
another with so few guidelines or so little supervision. It is a tribute to the
judiciary that abuses in sentencing do not occur more frequently.
Given the reluctance of the Florida supreme court to find the power of
sentence review in existing statutes, 1 26 this needed reform must proceed from
an informed and humane legislature that is ready to extend judicial review
in Florida to all aspects of the criminal justice process.
DARRYL M. BLOODWORTH

too harsh or too lenient? One writer has stated that, rather than looking only to the act
and actor, the court should use the following standard in reviewing: "Does this sentence,
as far as this convict in this society is concerned, serve the functional purpose of general

and special prevention and accord with the popular retributive feeling of the community?
If the answer dearly is 'No' on all the evidence on which the trial court acted and which
is now before the appellate court, an abuse of discretion has occurred, and the appellate
court must set aside the sentence and modify or remand, as the statute may provide."
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal But Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND.
L. Ray. 671, 687 (1962). The author states that such a standard should meet the following
demands of penal policy: retribution, general deterrence or prevention, special deterrence,
resocialization, neutralization, and penitence. Id. Whatever standard is used, however, developing sentencing policy will probably take a long time and a large volume of cases. As
an English author has stated: "Sentencing guidelines are most likely to be developed, insofar
as the English experience is an indication, by the gradual process of deciding many cases
rather than by a series of dramatic landmark decisions." Thomas, Appellate Review of
Sentences and the Development of Sentencing Policy: The English Experience, 20 U. ALA.
L. REv. 193, 221 (1968).
123. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75 HAtv.
L. Rzv. 904, 905 (1962), states in part: "Of all persons touched by the criminal process,
only the relatively small percentage who are brought to trial and acquitted or convicted
are directly affected by the safeguards of trial."
124. The penalty for robbery, for example, which may be anything from purse snatching

to armed robbery of a bank is: "[I]mprisonment in the state prison for life or for any
lesser term of years, at the discretion of the court." FLA. STAT. §813.011 (1969) (emphasis
added).
125. Davis v. State, 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960); Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 858, 18 So. 2d
458 (1943).
126. See Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943); Infante v. State, 197 So. 2d
542 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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The following is the result of a survey questionnaire sent to all judges in criminal
courts of record in Florida plus 10 circuit court judges randomly selected from those
circuits not having criminal courts of record.
Questionnaire
(1) By using a relative scale of one through eight, one being the most important factor,
give a relative weight to the factors listed below that you consider in formulating a sentence
for one convicted of a felony or misdemeanor.
Nature of the offense, including amount of force used or disregard for the safety
of the victim.
Defendant's prior record.
Presentence investigation report.
Demeanor of the defendant in court.
Occupation of the defendant.
Mental attitude of the defendant at the time of the crime as evidenced by
testimony in court or by a confession.
Suggested sentence by counsel on behalf of the client.
Other (please specify).
The following chart shows the number of judges who listed each factor as the most
important factor, second most important, et cetera. Each factor will not have the same
number of responses as all others since some judges felt some factors were of no importance
at all and hence not considered.
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4

1

1

2

6

5

8

5

8

1

2(c)

(9)

(b)

(e)

(a) Potential danger to society.
(b) Attitude of injured party, arresting officer and prosecuting attorney.
(c) Mitigation sought by ministers and family members.
(d) Psychiatric examination (when made).
(e) Whether the crime was a profit-type operation or one of passion.
(f) What factors caused the crime to be committed by the defendant, the likelihood of
those factors continuing to cause anti-social behavior in the future, and the extent to which
sentencing alternatives can eliminate or reduce those factors.
(g) Cost and liability to society on probation as opposed to prison. This judge also
stated he considers whether the defendant is merely a burden, a nuisance, or a menace to
his fellow man.
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(2) Do you personally use a presentence investigation report? If so, how often, and
how much weight do you give the report?
No: 0
Yes (at least most of the time): 23
All judges responding thought that that the presentence investigation report was of
considerable importance in formulating the sentence and the information therein was
usually weighted heavily in reaching the decision regarding the sentence.
(3) Would you object to a provision allowing the contents of the presentence investigation
report to be released to defense counsel prior to sentencing? If so, why?
Yes: 20
No: 3
The most frequently cited reason for not allowing the defendant to see the report is
that it would dry up confidential sources of information. One judge also stated it could
have an adverse effect on the defendant where a close relative recommended a period
of incarceration to straighten out the defendant.
(4) Do you as a judge have the opportunity to compare the sentences that you give to
those given by other judges? If so, how?
Yes: 12
No: 11
Some judges said that occasional conferences within their circuit are held to discuss
sentencing policy. Other than such conferences, sentence comparison only occurs through
informal conversations at judicial conferences and through newspaper reports.
(5) Are you opposed to any type of appellate review of a sentence on the ground that
it is excessive although it is within statutory limits? If so, why?
Yes. 15
No: 8
The majority of those opposed to appellate review of sentences stated that the broad
discretion in sentencing was necessary and the appellate judge could not improve upon
their decision just by looking at a cold record. Also, the possibility of frivolous appeals
and crowded dockets was mentioned.
(6) Do you think that a requirement for the judge to list the reasons for giving the particular sentence given in each case would lead to more uniform results in sentencing?
Yes: I
No: 22
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